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ABSTRACT 
The paper looks at the digital portrait used in the form of avatars 
in various online worlds and communication networks. It 
describes an ongoing modal shift from an ontological 
understanding of the portrait towards the portrait as performative 
act.  
In accordance with the Western semiotic divide between 
representational fiction and material reality proper, the portrait-
avatar is often still described as a representation that depicts the 
subject on the basis of a segregation between the living subject 
and the portrait. But the avatar-portrait functions as embodiment, 
thereby fulfilling a mainly performative and not epistemic 
purpose. Surpassing even the concept of the extension, the user 
and her portrait-avatar can be seen, rather, as a performing and 
communicating unit.  
The paper looks at Eastern iconology, where the portrait is an 
energetic transmitter in which the depiction and the depicted 
converge in the realness of the picture. Key concepts such as 
prototype, archetype, and inverse perspective are discussed and 
applied to the art piece Can you see me now? by Blast Theory. 
Keywords 
Avatar, portrait, icon, communication, body extension. 
1. INTRODUCTION: EMBEDDED 
SCREENS   
Screens and images seem to be an anachronism in the era of 
pervasive computing. The very idea of pervasive computing, and 
accordingly the design of pervasive technologies, is based on the 
notion of invisibility. Pervasive technologies, their operational 
algorithms and the factual outcome should be embedded in the 
actuality and reality of the human being, making the notion of the 
user obsolete, since in the best case scenario s/he is not aware of 
these technologies. In fact, screen based technologies seem to 
constitute an obstacle for this vision of embeddedness and all-
encompassing technologies, precisely because they seem to render 
an interface that divides and thereby constructs different 
ontological realms: a physical reality and a virtual data-space and 
its visualizations. In order to avoid this split, calm technologies 
make use of input and output devices that either are not meant to 
be noticed (the famous scenario of the intelligent toilet and 
refrigerator or other form of ambient intelligence) or that employ 
those human senses that are said to perceive either immediate 
nearby reality like tactility, proprioception, or inescapable reality 
like sounds. This categorization of senses is obviously based on a 
division between reflective and non-reflective senses. The visual 
sense, especially in conjunction with the medium of pictures and 
images, is said to delineate reality from represented reality (e.g. 
[13], [21]; it is widely seen as a sense that enables and supports 
reflection, whereas senses such as tactility and smell seem to 
unify the human subject with his surroundings. I do not want to 
engage in a discussion about the usefulness and validity of these 
categories, but for me there is no question that it is not the sense 
per se but a cultural formation of the senses by different media 
usages that enhances (or diminishes) the reflective recognition.  
This is also observable in the field of electronic art. David 
Rokeby’s installation piece and software Very Nervous System 
[23] deliberately does not use screens. Instead the artefact 
measures the participant’s positions and postures and uses the 
resulting data for sound and music generation. Even though the 
participant is aware of the artistic framing of the interaction, the 
very modality of the interaction seeks to obliterate this framing by 
relating the presence of the material space with the participant’s 
proprioception and omnipresent sound. Very Nervous System 
enhances a material, ontologically secured space, in order to avoid 
visual displays and their images, which in general, regardless of 
the applied technologies or formats, mount a distinction between 
reality and something that reflects reality in one way or another. 
Char Davis’ canonical installation Osmose [24] also seeks to 
immerse the participant into a reactive space. She applies 
technologies that measure bodily functions and body postures. 
Contrary to Very Nervous System though, the artistic space of 
Osmose is constructed as an all-enwrapping 3D space facilitated 
by a head mounted display (HMD), where the image replaces 
reality’s visual features by negating the frame of the image.  
Both pieces assert the logic of the reflective screen, since both try 
to avoid or overcome it. I want to question this seemingly 
inevitable tendency of the displayed image to construct a divide 
by proposing that, in the wake of omnipresent computing, the 
epistemological status of the image has changed or at least is in 
the process of changing.  
Of course, digital imagery is a vast field ranging from digitalized 
paintings from art history to vector based graphics and digital 
photography. I want to focus on the portrait used as avatar in 
electronic art. Additionally, I will look at some examples from 
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social computing and online worlds. This article seeks to show 
that the dominance of the ‘reflective significance’ of the image is 
in decline. Instead the image is, especially when used by 
pervasive technologies and various kinds of virtual online worlds, 
a medium of embodied communication. This calls for an altered 
conceptualization of the digital portrait.  
2. CAN YOU SEE ME NOW? 
A portrait depicts a person by means of painting, sculpture or 
photography, normally with the face as the predominant body part 
conveying the individual personal traits of the depicted. Yet, the 
portrait is not confined to the face; the whole body or parts of it, 
as well as symbolic attributes and props can depict individuality 
and social status. The etymology of the portrait asserts that the 
portrait “traces or draws forth” (from lat.: trahere – to drag [25]). 
Used as avatar in data spaces, the portrait can have a variety of 
expressions and features depending on the function and 
visualization of the data world in question. In social websites, the 
avatar-portrait is mostly a digital picture of the user; in MMO’s 
the avatar is a synthetically constructed 3D or 2D figure. But it is 
not so much the pictorial and formal design of the portrait-avatar, 
but its function and usage in virtual realms that discloses the 
alleged epistemological shift of the picture.  
My example, which informs my argument throughout the paper, is 
Blast Theory’s art project Can you see me now? (2001), because 
of the piece’s exemplary blending  or better, simultaneity  of 
virtual and urban spaces. This simultaneity lies at the roots of the 
functional significance of the avatar-portrait. Can you see me 
now? is an urban gaming project that combines and juxtaposes 
effectively urban, material spaces and their virtual representation 
on screen. The game consists of two parties, so-called runners and 
players. Runners are flesh and blood persons located in well-
defined real urban districts chasing virtual avatars. Players, who 
can participate in the game from their personal computer at home 
or from computer terminals set up by the organizers, control the 
virtual avatars.  
The website for the game in Brasilia states:  
“Players are dropped at random locations into a virtual map of 
the streets around the Praxa Duque de Caxias in Belo Horizonte. 
Tracked by satellites, Blast Theory's runners appear online next to 
your player. Situated in the real city, handheld computers 
showing the position of online players guide the runners in 
tracking you down.” [22] 
The communication between those ontologically different realms 
is done by conventional PCs with monitors, mice and keyboards 
on the side of the players and on the side of the runners by PDA 
with GPS navigation systems and auditory transmission devices. 
The PC and PDA give access to the virtual data representation of 
the very same urban space depicting a cartographic image that 
includes both the player’s and the runner’s avatar in the form of a 
simple icon of a running man.  
“Use your arrow keys to flee down the virtual streets, send 
messages and exchange tactics with other online players. An 
audio stream from Blast Theory's walkie talkies lets you 
eavesdrop on your pursuers: getting lost and out of breath on the 
real streets. If a runner gets within 5 meters of you, a sighting 
photo is taken and your game is over.”[22] 
The interplay between these two different spaces problematizes 
the notion of reality and representation, since the runners are 
chasing virtual persons that are populating the urban space. Yet 
the very same persons are sitting somewhere else in front of their 
computer monitors. The players simultaneously exist in the 
terminal room and in the real space of the city - and yet, as we all 
would concede, they do not. The players are captured, their 
pictures are taken, but the photo consists merely of space - and an 
imperceptible ghost (for the knowing participant and beholder). 
The players and runners are represented by small pictographs of a 
human figure comparable with the pictographs in traffic lights or 
escape signs. Can you see me now? uses very simple avatars, and 
one can criticize my conflation of portrait photos and pictogram; 
yet the performative aspects of the pictograms open up the 
possibility for using portraits in ubiquitous online domains. No 
mimetic personalized form connects the player with his avatar, yet 
the runners in the urban space are chasing distinct, yet absent 
players. The playful merger of virtual and urban spaces gives the 
crude avatar another status. The player interacts through the avatar 
with real persons. The same is the case of other online worlds. 
This correlation in action between the avatar and the player/runner 
constructs a performative relationship between them.  
3. EPISTEMOLOGICAL SEPARATIONS 
Robert Jauß [9] claims that the distinction between reality and 
fiction is a typical modern trait initiated in the middle of the 12th 
century. The Middle Ages, so he writes, was unaware of the 
notion of historical truth. The mere materiality of a document 
guaranteed its truthfulness; the reliability of documents was not 
questioned. Hence interpretations and historic facts were 
indissolubly intertwined.  
But since the dawn of modernity during the Renaissance, reality 
has been defined as a stable supra-personal fact beyond subjective 
perception. Even today, perceptual subjectivity still seems to 
endanger factual reality. Reality has to be verifiable by scientific 
measurements and is thus ‘true’ for each and everyone. The 
scientific method of natural science was one of the catalysts of 
modernity, which created an everyday culture that began to 
distinguish between reality and its antinomy fiction. Fiction has 
since been defined as something made up either by intentional 
active fantasies (novels, theatre plays, and motion pictures) or 
(supposedly) unintentional and sometimes pathological 
imaginations (e.g. schizophrenia).  
The arts in particular have exploited and still are exploiting this 
divide. Alberti [1] created the window metaphor in order to 
Figure 1. Screen dump, Can you see me now? Blast 
Theory [26] 
 
delineate the represented in its mathematical harmony. Leonardo 
da Vinci’s drawings and sketches of bodies were scientific, 
anatomical depictions and at the same time artistic investigations. 
Another example is the theatre since the era of the Enlightenment 
in the 17th century. This theatre is based on the impermeable 
distinction between fiction and reality. Not only do the stage 
curtain, the stage itself, etc. construct a divide between reality and 
fiction, positioning the observer at a distance, but right in front, 
the fictional occurrences on stage are also seen as a kind of 
epistemological mirror, reflecting reality and disclosing truth by 
means of, for example, metaphors. This is even re-reflected in the 
presented narrative, where the hero’s recognition of ‘true’ 
motivations and reasons for the displayed fictional occurrences is 
a recurrent theme. The arts, being the manager of imagination, 
were now able to point at hidden (and therefore seemingly factual) 
truths by making up reflecting fictions. Due to the humanistic 
ethos of the Renaissance, the painted portrait obtained an 
important value; the reflective human positioned himself in the 
center of the world. 
By contrast, the purpose of medieval processions, parades, and 
liturgical dramas is to be found in the appraisal of the truthfulness 
of a transcendental kingdom beyond earthly materiality and 
imperfection. There was no need for fiction since truth in the form 
of eternal forces resided beyond human recognition, with 
discernible influences on earthly life. Thus, images and portraits 
were venerated as materializations of eternal forces used in 
liturgical processions, and not seen as mere depictions of late or 
living individuals. 
Since Modernism, the distinction between reality and fiction has 
been under constant evaluation; it is a main focal point of 
‘modern’ art altogether. Luhmann’s [12] system theory makes this 
distinction even into the basic formal operation of autonomous art, 
reflecting the general epistemological thematization of the subject 
as observer forming an observed reality. According to him, each 
piece of art constructs its particular world by observing ‘the 
world’ thereby constructing a difference between the thus 
established fictitious or ‘observed’ world and its umwelt (its 
surround, which by definition cannot be known). In Modernity, 
the system of art operates through a ‘re-entry’ of its initial 
distinction between reality and fiction into itself (rendering a 
second order observation). In other words, modern art often 
thematizes the distinction between reality and fiction, thereby 
complicating it without being able to abolish it. Even though the 
different avant-garde movements tried to abolish the divide 
between fiction and life praxis, they ended up enforcing the 
system of art. For example, Happenings and performance theatre 
were, and still are, problematizing the strategy of the epistemic 
mirror by abolishing the stage as confined space for fiction and 
emphasizing the reality of performative actions (see e.g. 
theoreticians like Fischer-Lichte [7], Schechner [16] or artists like 
Kaprow, Beuys, Naumann, and many more). Even though the 
relationship between reality and fiction is complex and 
ambiguous, it is nevertheless a distinction the autonomy of 
Western art is based upon. 
4. THE FICTITIOUS IMAGE 
It is plausible to consider the arts’ thematic and formal 
examination of its own distinctions as a token for an ongoing shift 
of the image’s general epistemic status. Paradoxically, the usage 
of the photographic image in different art forms underpins this 
development. The photographic image is generally considered to 
be a material thus documentary trace of reality (e.g. Barthes [3], 
Sontag [15]). The optical apparatus conserves and depicts reality 
[15]. The act of perceiving photographic pictures including 
portraits has been analytical. The observer looks back in time at 
an already passed observation, either reviving personal memories 
or interpreting possible origins and genealogies of family or 
ancestors, archaeological imaginations of people(s) remote in time 
and space, etc. The very act of looking at pictures seems to be a 
realization of the difference between representation and reality, 
and of the forever lost.  
Yet, the arts are complicating this sense of reality. On the one 
hand, the fact that photos in newspaper and other news media 
maintain and transmit a sense of reality, gives a sense of factuality 
to art photos that are exhibited and declared as art. On the other 
hand, exhibitions of documentaries in galleries and museums 
negate this assumption, once again complicating the distinction. 
And doesn’t Pop Art’s referential usage of photos and video - be it 
portraits or soup cans - not question and modify the documentary 
promise of photos in mass media? The invention of digital 
photography questions further and even more rigorously the 
ontological foundation of photography.  
If fiction is defined as mimesis or correspondence (Aristotle) 
belonging exclusively to the arts, then it must be the particular use 
of the photographic image that determines the fictional character 
of the image. The distinction between fiction and reality has long 
left the field of ontology and has become an observational 
construction and prerequisite. Fictitiousness is a product of the 
insertion of a (media) difference, namely the difference between 
the observed and the depiction of the observed. Seen in this 
perspective, any photographic image is fictitious, since it always 
will be a second order observation due to its mechanical and 
asynchronous quality. Even live transmitted video images cannot 
liberate themselves from fictitiousness, being observations by 
means of media machines. This also holds true in the case of, for 
example, performance theatre working with real time mediated 
images shown on stage monitors, since the performance and the 
camera already mark several observational distinctions.  
However, hidden in Sontag’s characterization of the photograph 
as giving an appearance of (voyeuristic) participation [15]), lies 
the seed for the participatory, performative characterization of the 
image.  
5. PERFORMATIVE PICTURE 
The underlying assumption of my argument so far seems to be 
that the visual display, being the preferred medium today, is 
indissolubly connected with the reality/fiction distinction. 
Reflection and recognition seems to be enabled by the picture’s 
capacity for distancing the onlooker. This leads ultimately to the 
claim of an epistemic sense-hierarchy, where the visual sense 
seems to reside at the ‘reflective top’ as a result of either a 
historic, contingent development or a biological and evolutionary 
fact. As said before, I do not want here to engage in this 
discussion; my hypothesis is a different one, namely that the 
usage of digital imagery in online domains is changing the 
modality, use, and reception of the portrait from being a reflective 
portrayal to a performative medium.  
The data space of online domains is often called meta-space and is 
generally described as virtual reality (VR), comprising either 
 
abstract, not perceivable data and/or visualizations of these data. 
In the case of many multiuser online games, virtual reality denotes 
a very distinct fictive world showing landscapes and villages or 
futuristic scenarios. Many computer games use fiction worlds as a 
framework for interaction between players. For example, the 
game “World of Warcraft” takes place in adventurous universes 
that are inspired by pre- or rather a-historical mythological realms. 
Also, social online platforms like Second Life construct a 
‘second’ world as a virtual meeting place. There seems to be no 
doubt that VR has to be subsumed under the category of fiction. 
In the case of other social sites such as Facebook, which do not 
make use of representational worlds, the question of 
categorization is more complex since the site does not apply 
mimetic strategies even though the site is clearly a constructed 
metaverse where people ‘meet’ via photos, updates, chat, and 
other applications.  
In an academic, aesthetic discourse, the avatar has therefore long 
been compared to a theatrical role belonging to the fictional 
realm. Paradoxically, the avatar is also considered to be a 
representation of the player in the virtual world, although the 
avatar in no way has to correspond with the user’s material and 
historical ‘reality’, neither physiologically nor psychologically. 
On the contrary, the avatar is often seen as a representation of a 
fictitious figure (elves, etc.). Even in the more or less realistic 
representational world of Second Life, the avatar can have the 
shape of anthropomorphic animals or whatever other figure. The 
player is thus said to en-act (to role-play) the avatar, which 
thereby represents both a fictional figure and him/herself. 
Following the logic of the reality/fiction divide, the player seems 
to be divided between on the one side playing a fictional role, 
which by definition is not the player’s self (e.g. Schechner [16]), 
and on the other side, being represented as a ‘person’.  
Since theatrical plays (and motion pictures) are artistic 
expressions presented to an audience, they always communicate 
their very fictitiousness by, among other things, inserting a frame 
into the material continuum of the stage and the auditorium. In 
motion pictures and TV, monitors and projection screens draw 
this division line. The realism of picture and sound is here 
guaranteeing the material continuum between the represented and 
the referred. The highlighted paradox of a material or 
representational continuum and the referentiality of signs is the 
very foundation of the audience's ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ 
and its emotional and intellectual engagement (the famous ‘as if’).  
Online worlds are different. They are intended for players and 
users who want to communicate and (inter-)act with each other 
either in artificial worlds or virtual social platforms. There is no 
audience, only players. Here, the technological divide between 
virtual and material worlds has to be overcome, minimized and 
dissolved. Hence, we have to look at the epistemic modality of the 
avatar from the perspective of performativity, not reflexivity [8]. 
The very concept of the avatar-portrait in virtual worlds evades 
the Western notion of pictorial, mimetic representation by being 
profoundly performative and participatory. The avatar-portrait and 
its use as communicative tool have changed (or propel the process 
of changing) the very notion of the portrait. They are able to build 
affective and communicative bridges between the material realm 
of the player and the virtual worlds of his/her avatar. Digital 
technology, which is able to construct very concrete palpable 
feedback mechanisms activating the majority of our senses, help a 
great deal to overcome this ontological divide, e.g. tactile 
feedback systems, which allow occurrences in virtual worlds to 
have physical consequences for the player; or biosensor systems, 
which use unconscious or conscious user data like heart beat, skin 
conductivity etc. in the presentation of the avatar and/or the 
modulation of narrative traits in the virtual world. Yet, I claim that 
technology only supports this development, not engenders it. The 
crucial change lies within the altered epistemic characteristics of 
the avatar picture itself  
6. THE CONCEPT OF THE BYZANTINE 
ICON 
In order to grasp the decisive difference between reflecting and 
performative representation, between “art as a means of 
separating subject and object and hence creating aesthetic 
distance” and “art as a means of bridging the subject and object” 
[20], I want to revisit the concept of the Byzantine icon. The 
Byzantine icon is originally a ceremonial and performative part of 
the Christian liturgy. Painted mostly on wooden tiles or as frescos, 
the icon depicts holy subjects like saints, Mary or Christ himself. 
It is simultaneously “a scenic representation and presentation” [5]. 
This duplicity is at the core of Eastern iconology since it contains 
two functions at the same time: it is both a visual representation 
(of the depicted venerated person) and a concrete materialisation 
(of the depicted and their supra-natural, eternal forces). Liturgical 
veneration as “dramatic enactment” [5] reveals and, more 
important, operationalizes a “likeness in essence” between the 
depicted (presentation) and the depiction (representation), making 
the icon an energetic transmitter for the believer more than a 
reflection in a Platonic sense. Consequently, the icon is a kind of 
material carriage transmitting the believer’s veneration to the 
depicted. The icon materializes in this way the saint; hence s/he 
forms part of this earthly world.  
In the orthodox worldview “man must always relate to the 
spiritual through the physical”, Auxentios [2] writes. This 
‘physical spirituality’ allows “that [the icon] constitutes a real 
image of that which it depicts. The image is in some way a 'true' 
form of the prototype, participating in it and integrally bound to 
it” [2]. A prototype (or archetype) is the energetic essence of the 
depicted and the icon the material medium for it; or as H. Belting 
expresses it: “The difference between the image and what is 
represented seemed to be abolished in [the icons]; the image was 
Figure 2. facebook, screen dump 
 
the person it represented, at least this person’s active, miracle-
working presence, […]” [4]. The image and the depicted person 
conflate in the archetype, in one presence. This is hard to grasp for 
a western mind like mine, since our cultural mindset seems to be 
molded by Alberti’s and the Renaissance’s window metaphor, 
which stresses the absolute divide between reality and painted or 
otherwise mediated representations.   
7. VIRTUAL ONLINE DOMAINS AND 
CONCEPTUAL BLENDING 
Despite the undeniable differences between more profane online 
sites and religious practices, between spiritual realms and virtual 
reality, there are striking similarities, which help in identifying 
and describing the ongoing status transformation of the digital 
portrait. Like the orthodox icon, the avatar is both a pictorial 
representation and presentation: a representation of a fictitious 
figure and a presentation of the player.  
Firstly, the avatar-icon can be a representation of a fictitious 
figure, often taken from mythological narratives and universes. It 
is no coincidence that many online games and worlds are built 
around mythological themes with orcs, tauren, dwarfs etc., 
constructing an eternal, timeless platform for the players’ 
potential actions. These actions don’t have to follow a certain 
predetermined narrative path, but are obviously inspired by these 
mythological, narrative themes. In other cases the avatar is a 
representation of a custom made figure, which can, but need not 
depict the player’s worldly appearance. But, secondly, the icon is 
first of all a presentation of the players’ communications and 
actions in the virtual world. The avatar is therefore to be 
understood as a performative ‘prototype’ that allows for 
interpersonal communication and actions in virtual realms. The 
fictional figure and the player’s actions conflate in the prototype 
or archetype. In the case of an online game, while playing, the 
player and the fictitious character cannot any longer be separated.  
But how can we accept and explain the simultaneity of two 
different ontological states? Robert Scott, in his article on relics 
[17], explains the phenomenon of the mystical transference of 
holy forces by means of material relics of deceased saints, by 
applying Turner and Fauconnier’s idea of conceptual blending. 
The three mental spaces mentioned (the saint, the divine and the 
corpse) blend into a forth concept: the relic. If we apply the 
conceptual blending theory to our theme, the avatar can be 
understood as the emergent result of the conceptual blending of 
the avatar portrait as representation of a fictive or existing figure 
and of the avatar-portrait as presentation of the user/player’s 
actions. The orthodox icon “was a scheme that could be filled 
with new life, for the intention was not to preserve an earthly form 
but to communicate the archetype that alone justified the cult of 
images itself.” [4] The iconic portrait frames and makes possible 
conceptual blending – in the moment of performance (be the 
performance of religious veneration or communication in virtual 
realms). The archetype as conceptual and performative emergence 
supersedes the inherent dichotomy between the subject and its 
various representations. 
The avatar is a performative part of the player. The performative 
action, not the contemplative reflection, constructs a direct 
affective and emotional bond between the player and his/her 
iconic presentation. That is why occurrences in virtual online 
worlds can cause bodily effects (as described by e.g. [19], Taylor 
[18] and many others); that is why we can experiment with our 
personal and social behaviors and our identities in more than a 
symbolic, semiotic way. 
8. INTERPENETRATING REALITIES  
Since the first performance of Blast Theory’s piece in 2001, 
mobile technology has made a huge leap in the convergence of 
different technologies. Today, smart phones like the iPhone and 
similar products facilitate Wi-Fi and GPS functions, allowing the 
user to be online and making visible their own and others 
geographical positions. Also, Blast Theory developed the 
interfaces and the cartographic maps, which in their Tokyo 
performance is an immersive 3D world where the players actually 
can choose different perspectives. The avatars are not simple 
pictograms anymore, but are often digital portraits of the user and 
his/her friends and acquaintances. My cell phone rings and shows 
the picture of the friend calling. I not only get a second for mental 
preparation, before actually talking to my friend, but the portrait’s 
visual sensory expression seems to open the communication 
channel. Facebook and similar social sites, which also can be 
accessed by smart phones everywhere and at any time, include the 
portrait in the interface, making it a permeable icon during the 
communicational act. The portrait is no longer a counterfeit, but 
functions through “likeness” [2][4][14]. Likeness has nothing to 
do with realistic depictions of visual appearances, but is to be 
understood as concordance between user and avatar that supports 
communicative and emotional agency. The concept of likeness 
has shifted from an epistemological to a performative one.  
The formal composition of Byzantine icons is often based on 
reversed (or inverted) perspective with the beholder as the 
vanishing point. This is, as the term indicates, opposite to 
Renaissance linear perspective, which places the focal point at the 
horizon of the depicted space. The linear perspective ‘constructs a 
beholder’, who is not part of the picture and furthermore not 
existent, because detached contemplation transcends the act of 
observation into the timeless being of the represented. The iconic 
picture in contrast situates the believer as a part of the picture, 
Figure 3. Christ and Saint Mina 6th-century icon from 
Bawit Egyp 
 
since s/he is the very focal point; somebody else is contemplating 
the performance of veneration. It is true that many online worlds 
are constructed according to the geometrical rules of Cartesian 
spaces, yet the focal point is constantly shifting depending on the 
user’s actions, choice of perspective, and, not in the least, the 
other avatars’ (players’) actions. In the case of Facebook, the 
portrait is but a tiny part of a mainly textual world. Thus, inverted 
perspective must in our case not be seen as the opposite of the 
dominating pictorial paradigm, but as an indication of the 
performative functions of the portrait in ubiquitous computing. 
The users form by means of the avatar portrait part of the ‘one 
reality’ of communication conflating ontologically separated 
realms.  
9. CONCLUSION 
For the orthodox outlook, the materiality of the picture and the 
picture’s referential ‘content’ is of equal importance. “Both the 
material and the immaterial find themselves on the same side 
[…]“, writes Auxentios [2]. There is no impenetrable division line 
between the created earthly and the uncreated holy. Ubiquitous 
online worlds are not transcendental in a religious sense, avatars 
do not seek entrance to eternity, but they permit access to 
immaterial data driven communication domains. Computer 
monitors are widely seen as screens conveying information. But 
monitors are also material artifacts. The runners of Can you see 
me now? carry material devices. Smart phones are material 
artifacts (that are, by the way, sometimes carried around like 
relics). As with orthodox icons the materiality of computer 
devices ensures the continuum between intangible data space and 
the individual user. The communicator relates through body 
movements and postures to the device and to the iconic 
presentation of the other, and subsequently to the other 
him/herself.   
It is the player’s actions that let emerge the avatar portrait as a 
prototype, thereby dissolving the distinction between subject and 
its representation and between material and virtual reality. The 
avatar portrait as archetype surpasses our understanding of a 
technological medium, since the iconic picture constructs a direct 
material and sensory relationship between people in the act of 
communication, despite the fact that communication technology 
only transmits measurable data based on physical laws (e.g. 
measurable parameters of the voice). The digital iconic avatar 
seems to undermine the western epistemic distinction between the 
human subject and pictorial representation, questioning the notion 
of the body as a mainly biologically defined entity. This 
subsequently calls for a revision of the humanistic concept of 
identity, which has its foundation in the material human body as 
enclosed entity. The (technologically extended) performative 
body on the contrary transcends material limits without ever 
losing its material and homeostatic dependency.   
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